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SECTION 1983 LITIGATION:
HISTORY AND POLICY SPELL THE DEMISE OF
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR PRIVATE DEFENDANTS

Wyatt v. Cole

112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992)
MichaelD. Simmons
I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past twenty-five years, the United States Supreme Court has developed qualified immunity which protects public officials from liability for civil
rights violations committed while exercising their discretionary responsibilities. 1
The doctrine is premised on the English common law maxim that the "king can do
no wrong." 2 While lower federal courts consistently applied the Supreme Court's
qualified immunity doctrine to protect a variety of public officials, many of these
same courts were split on the issue of whether qualified immunity should be available to private defendants facing civil rights litigation.3
In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. ,' the Supreme Court left open the question of
whether private parties faced with 42 U.S.C. § 19835 litigation may rely on a
good faith defense or on qualified immunity.6 This question was answered by the
Court in Wyatt v. Cole.7 In Wyatt, the Court analyzed the common law origins of
qualified immunity8 and the rationale for allowing public officials faced with

1. The 1967 case of Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), was the first time the Court recognized qualified
immunity. For further discussion, see infra
notes 80-108 and accompanying text.
2. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRrs § 131, at 1033 (5th ed. 1984).

3. See infra
notes 168-240 and accompanying text.
4. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
5. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
6. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942 n.23. Justice O'Connor stated:
Justice Powell is concerned that private individuals who innocently make use of seemingly valid state
laws would be responsible, if the law is subsequently held to be unconstitutional, for the consequences of
their actions. In our view, however, this problem should be dealt with not by changing the character of the
cause of action but by establishing an affirmative defense. A similar concern is at least partially responsible for the availability of a good-faith defense, or qualified immunity, to state officials. We need not reach
the question of the availabilityof such a defense to private individualsat this juncture. . . . Nor do we mean
to determineat this juncture whether there areany defenses availableto defendants in § 1983 actions ....
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
7. 112S. Ct. 1827(1992).
8. Id. at 1831-32.
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§ 1983 litigation to invoke qualified immunity 9 and held that qualified immunity is
not available to private party § 1983 defendants. 10
This note first examines the historical origins of qualified immunity and identifies the rationale for denying qualified immunity to private parties. The note then
evaluates the soundness of this rationale and seeks to identify what defenses, if
any, remain available to private party § 1983 defendants in the wake of Wyatt.
II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In July 1986, respondent Bill Cole sought to dissolve a partnership in a cattle
business with petitioner Howard Wyatt."' When no agreement could be reached
on division of the partnership assets, Cole consulted with an attorney, respondent
11.12 On Cole's behalf, Robbins filed a replevin action in Mississippi
John Robbins
3
state court. 1
After Robbins filed the replevin complaint and bond, the state court ordered the
county sheriff to seize cattle, a tractor, and other personal property from Wyatt.14
At a post-seizure hearing, the state court dismissed Cole's replevin complaint and
ordered the property seized pursuant to the writ of replevin be returned to Wyatt.' 5
Cole refused to comply with the order. 6
Instead of pursuing the matter in state court, Wyatt filed suit in federal district
court under § 1983.17 In his federal claim, Wyatt challenged the constitutionality
of Mississippi's replevin statute and sought injunctive relief and damages from the
respondents, the County Sheriff, and the deputies involved in the seizure.18
The district court held Mississippi's replevin statute violated due process.' 9
While the court did find the replevin statute to be unconstitutional, it also found

9. Id. at 1833.
10. Id. at 1834.
11. Id. at 1829.
12. Id.
13. Id. Mississippi's then-extant replevin statute, MISS. CoDE ANN. § 11-37-101 (West Supp. 1988), allowed
an individual to obtain a court order for seizure of another's property by posting a replevin bond, swearing to a
state court that the applicant was entitled to the property, and that the adversary wrongfully took and detained the
property in question. Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1829 (1992). The statute gave the judge no discretion in
deciding whether or not to issue the writ of replevin. Id.
14. 14att, 112 S.Ct. at 1829.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Wyatt v. Cole, 710 F. Supp. 180, 183 (S.D. Miss. 1989). In holding the statute to be unconstitutional, the
district court found that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents the taking of private
property by replevin without pre-seizure notice and a pre-seizure hearing. Id. at 182 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972); North Ga. Finishing v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975)). In both of these cases, the
Supreme Court held that statutes allowing seizures prior to notice and a hearing violated due process. Fuentes,
407 U.S. at 96; North Ga. Finishing, 419 U.S. at 606. The district court found that the lack ofjudicial discretion
in deciding whether or not to issue a writ of replevin under Mississippi's statute made it unnecessary to decide the
validity of the statute on inadequate notice grounds. Wyatt, 710 F. Supp. at 182 (citing Johnson v. American
Credit Co. of Ga., 581 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1978)).
Mississippi amended its replevin statute in 1990 to comport with due process. See Mss. CODE ANN. § 11-37101 (West Supp. 1990).
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that Cole and Robbins were entitled to qualified immunity from suit for damages
arising prior to such a finding of unconstitutionality. 2o
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of qualified immunity to Cole and Robbins.21
The Supreme Court held that qualified immunity, as reformulated and enunciated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,22 is not available to private defendants facing § 1983
liability for invoking state replevin, garnishment, and attachment statutes.23
III. HISTORY AND LAW

A. Section 1983 and QualifiedImmunity
Section 1983 created a "species of tort liability. '24 The Court in Mitchum v.
Foster25 stated that § 1983 "opened the federal courts to private citizens, offering a
uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state
law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation. ' 26 The
Mitchum Court further stated: "The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the
federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights -to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state
law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.' 27

Beginning with the 1961 case of Monroe v. Pape,28 the Court expanded the
spectre of § 1983 by holding that § 1983 provides a remedy for all violations of
constitutional rights by persons acting under color of law. 29 The Monroe Court extensively reviewed the legislative history of § 1983 in reaching this conclusion.3"
1. Legislative History of§ 1983
In 1868, the Reconstruction Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution." l The amendment was primarily aimed at providing equal protection and due process of law to recently freed slaves.32 Section Five of the

20. Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1829 (1992).
21. Wyattv.Cole, 928 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992).
22. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Harlow was handed down the day before the Court's decision in Lugar.
23. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1834.
24. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1980); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976).
25. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
26. Id. at 239.
27. Id. at 242 (quoting ExParte Virgina, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).
28. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), ovendedby Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
29. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171.
30. Id. at 171-91.
31. The United States Constitution Amendment XIV, § I provides in relevant part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
For historical background on the Fourteenth Amendment, see generally WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POUTICAL PROCESS TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (Harvard University Press 1988).
32. See infra note 37.
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Fourteenth Amendment 33 empowers Congress to enact appropriate legislation to
enforce the provisions of the Amendment.'
The Forty-second Congress, acting pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act [hereinafter the Act] .a Section 1983
is a codification of section one of the Act. 3 ' Legislative history to the Act indicates
that it was intended to counter the systematic discrimination and violence directed
at blacks that had developed in the South subsequent to the Civil War. 3 7 The original title to the Act was "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes."38
During floor debate on the Act, Representative Bingham stated that the purpose of
the Act was to be "the enforcement. . . of the Constitution on behalf of every citizen of the Republic . . . to the extent of the rights guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. ' '39 Senator Edmunds, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary and floor manager of the Act, stated:
The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to, as defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the United States when they are assailed by any State
law or under color of any State law, and it is merely carrying out the principles of the
civil rights bill [the Civil Rights Act of 1866], which has since become part of the
Constitution [the Fourteenth Amendment] .40
Citing the Act's legislative history, the Court in Carey v. Piphus4 1 stated that
§ 1983 was intended to create a special species of tort liability "in favor of persons
who are deprived of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured' to them by the
Constitution. "42

33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
34. Id.
35. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
Section 1of the Ku Klux Klan Act is also known as the Civil Rights Act of 1871. For the text of 42 U.S.C. §
1983, see supra note 5.
36. For the text of§ 1983, see supra note 5.
37. See generallyCONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., at app. 78 (1871). For a particularly good summary of
the history of the Act, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170-86 (1961), overruledby Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monroe, Justice Douglas used a historical analysis of the Act to find that
the illegal actions of thirteen Chicago police officers made the officers amenable to suit as their illegal actions
constituted action under color of law within the contemplation of§ 1983. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171-86. Without a
search warrant, the officers broke into the plaintiffs' home, detained plaintiff Monroe for more than ten hours on
open charges without allowing him to call his family, and finally released him without any charges being made
against him. Id. at 169. Befbre finding that the plaintiffs had stated a prima facie case, Justice Douglas stated that
a man must be held "responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." Id. at 187. See also EVERETTE
SWINNEY, SUPPRESSING THE Ku KLux KLAN: THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 18701877 (Garland Publishing 1987).
38. See supra note 35.
39. See CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at app. 81.
40. See id. at 568.
41. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
42. Id. at 253 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,417 (1976) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
172-83 (1961))); see also id. at 225-34 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,
238-42 (1972).
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2. From Monroe v. Pape to Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. -§ 1983 Matures
In Monroe v. Pape,4 the Court expanded what had previously been a narrow
interpretation of§ 1983. 4 According to the Court in Monroe, § 1983 was intended
to provide:
[A] federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect,
intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens
to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies. 45
In Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. , 6the Supreme Court adopted a two prong approach to § 1983 actions. 47 The Court held that a § 1983 plaintiff must show that
he or she has been deprived "of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the
was effected by one acting "under color of
United States"4 andthat the deprivation
49
any statute.

. . of any

State.

The petitioner in Adickes was a white school teacher who, accompanied by six
black students, was refused service at S. H. Kress' lunch counter."s Adickes was
subsequently arrested for vagrancy.5 1 She filed suit in federal district court alleging
a denial of equal protection.5 2 The complaint was filed under § 1983 and alleged
that S. H. Kress' employees had conspired with local police to deprive her of federally protected rights. 3 The district court directed a verdict for the defendants. 54
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that § 1983 "'requires that
the discriminatory. . . usage be proved to exist in the locale where the discrimination took place, and in the State generally.' , The Supreme Court reversed, holding
[tihe involvement of a state official in such a conspiracy plainly provides the state
action essential to show a direct violation of petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection rights, whether or not the actions of the police were officially authorized, or lawful. Moreover, a private party involved in such a conspiracy, even
though not an official of the State, can be liable under § 1983.56

43. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
44. See ROBERT H. FREILICH

AND RICHARD G. CARLISLE, SWORD AND SHIELD: SECTION
VIOLATIONS: THE LIABILITY OF URBAN, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 47 (ABA Press

Frejlich and Carlisle, Monroe "marked the beginning of modern § 1983 litigation." Id.
45. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180.
46. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
47. Id. at 150.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 146. The black school children were not refused service or arrested. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 147.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 409 F.2d 121, 124 (5th Cit. 1968).
56. Id. at 152 (citations omitted).

1983: CIVIL RIGHTS
1983). According to
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Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. , decided twelve years after Adickes, has had
broad implications for § 1983 litigation.5 8 Writing for the majority, Justice White
stated: "Whether they are identical or not, the state-action and under-color-ofstate-law requirements are obviously related." 9 Justice White opined that "it is
clear that in a § 1983 action brought against a state official, the statutory requirement of action 'under color of state law' and the 'state action' requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment are identical.""0
Justice White further stated that "while private misuse of a state statute does not
describe conduct that can be attributed to the State, the procedural scheme created
by the statute obviously is the product of state action."61 While this implicates state
action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, private misuse of a state statute
has § 1983 implications as well. The majority opinion recognized a two-prong approach to state action cases.2 The first prong required that a deprivation be
"caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule
of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible."63
The second prong mandated that the person responsible for the deprivation must
be one who is a state actor.64 Justice White stated in Lugar that if the second prong
'

57. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). Lugar is factually similar to 14att. Respondents in Lugar filed an ex parte action
under a Virginia statute which allowed prejudgment attachment of petitioner's property. Id. at 924. The statute
allowed respondent to file a petition in state court for attachment of petitioner's property. Id. at 925. The respondent had to state a belief that petitioner "was disposing of or might dispose of his property in order to defeat his
creditors." Id. at 924. The clerk of court then issued a writ of attachment which sequestered respondent's property. Id. at 925. At a post seizure hearing, a state trial judge dismissed the attachment order. Id. at 926. Petitioner
then filed a § 1983 action. Id. In his complaint, he alleged that the private party respondent had acted in concert
with a state official to deprive him of his property without due process of law. Id.
The Court intimated, but did not hold that Virginia's attachment statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 941-42.
58. The Court in Lugar held that conduct which is found to be state action for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment also satisfies the action under color of law requirement of § 1983. Id. at 936.
59. Id. at 928. Through an intricate analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment, § 1983, and the Court's state
action jurisprudence, the Court held that conduct satisfying state action under the Fourteenth Amendment also
satisfies § 1983's under color of law requirement, but the converse does not hold true. Id. at 935 n. 18.
State action under the Fourteenth Amendment and action under color of law under § 1983 are beyond the scope
of this note. For articles on state action under the Fourteenth Amendment and action under color of law under
§ 1983, see Eric H. Zagrans, Under Colorof What Law?: A ReconstructedModel ofSection 1983 Liability, 71 VA.
L. REv. 499 (1985); Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move From Constitutionto Tort, 77 GEO. L.J.
1719 (1989); Susanah H. Mead, Evolution of the "Speciesof Tort Liability" Created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Can
ConstitutionalTort be Saved From Extinction?, 55 FORDHAm L. REVIEW 1 (1986); Gary S. Gilden, The Standard
of Culpability in Section 1983 and Bivens Actions: The Prima Facie Case, Qualified Immunity and the
Constitution, II HOFSTRA. L. REV. 557 (1983); see also Allison Hartwell Eid, PrivatePartyImmunities to Section
1983 Suits, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1323 (1990). See also ROBERT H. FREILICH AND RICHARD G. CARLISLE, SWORD
AND SHIELD: SECTION 1983: CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: THE LIABILITY OF URBAN, STATE AND LOCAL

GOVERNMENT (ABA Press 1983).
Justice White quoted Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970):
"Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting 'under color' of
law for purposes of [§ 1983]. To act 'under color' of law does not require that the accused be an officer of
the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents."
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941 (quotingAdickes, 398 U.S. at 152 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794

(1966))).
60. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 929.
61. Id. at 941.
62. Id. at 937.
63. Id. (citations omitted).

64. Id.
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of the state action analysis is satisfied by private misuse of a statute, then the conduct in question may be properly addressed in a § 1983 action.6 5
In a dissenting opinion in Lugar, Justice Powell questioned the majority's characterization of state action and action under color of law."6 Justice Powell criticized the Court's holding in another respect. He stated that the majority
erroneously "holds that respondent, a private citizen who did no more than commence a legal action of a kind traditionally initiated by private parties, thereby engaged in 'state action.' "67 This, according to Justice Powell, is inconsistent with
the Court's precedent. 8 The proper inquiry should be, according to Justice
Powell, "whether the respondent, a private citizen whose only action was to invoke
a presumptively valid state attachment process, had acted under color of state
law. "69
Justice Powell's concern that private individuals can be held liable for invoking
presumptively valid statutes was answered in footnote twenty-three of the majority opinion.7" In this footnote, Justice O'Connor stated that Justice Powell's concern should be addressed not by changing the nature of a § 1983 cause of action,
but rather by allowing such individuals to invoke a good faith defense or qualified
immunity.7 1 Justice Powell retorted that he agreed with the majority's suggestion
that the respondent may have good faith immunity available on remand.72 The
suggestion made in dicta by the majority's opinion in footnote twenty-three led the
respondents in Wyatt to assert qualified immunity.
3. Historical Development of Qualified Immunity in § 1983 Actions
The Act, the legislative history of the Act, and its modern-day progeny, § 1983,
are devoid of any reference to immunities. Absolute immunity, which extends to
judges and legislators, existed prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of

65.Id. at 941.
66. Id. at 945 (Powell, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 945.
69. Id. at 946.
70. Id. at942 n.23.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 956 n. 14.
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187 1.7 Absolute immunity, therefore, protects judges, legislators, and prosecutors from damage actions under § 1983." 4 Absolute immunity protects judges
when acting within theirjurisdiction,7" legislators when acting within a traditional
legislative capacity,76 and prosecutors when acting as advocates in criminal proceedings.

Absolute immunity acts as an automatic and complete shield to liability in
§ 1983 actions.78 It would be almost one hundred years after the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 before the Court would develop qualified immunity to
afford protection to public officials not traditionally protected by absolute immu79
nity.
The 1967 case of Pierson v. Ray8" saw the genesis of a qualified or good faith
immunity from suit. 1 In Pierson, fifteen black and white clergymen entered a
waiting room at a bus terminal, disobeying a sign that read "White Waiting Room
Only -By Order of the Police Department."8 2 They were arrested by respondent
police officers and charged under a state statute83 which made it a misdemeanor
for persons to congregate in a public place under circumstances which created a
threat of breach of the peace."' After a trial in which the clergymen were found
guilty and sentenced to the maximum penalty of four months in jail and a fine of
$200, one of the clergymen appealed. 8" After the appellate court ordered a new
trial,86 the trial court granted the petitioner's motion for a directed verdict, and the
cases against the other petitioners were dropped." Petitioners then brought a

73. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors); Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (legislators); Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators).
The Speech and Debate Clause of Article I of the Constitution extends privilege from arrest (immunity) to senators and representatives while going to and returning from a session and for any speech and debate that takes place
during a session. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
In Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358 (1991), the Court denied a state executive official's assertion of absolute immunity. Id. at 364. In Burns v. Reed, I Il S. Ct. 1934 (1991), the Court affirmed a grant of absolute immunity to
a state prosecuting attorney in a § 1983 action for participating in a probable cause hearing. Id. at 1944. The
Court denied the same prosecutor's assertion of absolute immunity for giving advice to the police. Id. at 1945.
Neither he nor the court below has identified any historical or common-law support for such an extension. American common law [is determinative] . . . .[We do] not have a license to establish immunities
from § 1983 actions in the interests of what [we] judge to be soundpublic policy.

Id. at 1936 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
74. SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, § 7.01 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
NAHMOD].

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
386 U.S. 547 (1967).
Id. at 557.
Id. at 552.

83. Miss. CODE ANN. § 2087.5 (1942).
84. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 549.
85. Id. at 549-50.
86. Id. at 550.
87. Id. at 549.
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§ 1983 action for damages against respondents in federal district court. 88 After the
jury returned verdicts for the respondents on both counts, the clergymen appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.89
The Fifth Circuit held that the respondent police officers would be liable under
§ 1983 for an unconstitutional arrest, even if made in good faith and with probable
cause.9" Citing Golden v. Thompson,91 the court held that the officers would have
good faith immunity under the common law of Mississippi and that this immunity
should be available to the officers in the § 1983 action.92 The court went further,
however, saying that the Supreme Court's holding in Monroe v. Pape93 foreclosed
the officers from asserting such an immunity."4
The Supreme Court in Pierson stated that the Fifth Circuit had misread its holding in Monroe." The PiersonCourt further stated that the holding in Monroe must
be viewed from two perspectives: liability on the one hand, and defenses on the
other.9 The Court then held the common law defenses of good faith and probable
cause to be available to the officers in the § 1983 action.97 "The legislative record
[of the Act] gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all
common-law immunities." 98
With this holding, the Court, perhaps unknowingly, created what would in later
cases evolve into qualified immunity.99 The Court recognized this in Imbler v.
Pachtman, °° holding that § 1983 "creates a species of tort liability that on its face

88. Id.
89. Id. The Fifth Circuit's opinion is reported at Pierson v. Ray, 352 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965), affd in part,
386 U.S. 547 (1967).
90. Pierson, 352 F.2d at 221. The court held the arrest to be unconstitutional because the state statute under
which petitioners had been charged had been declared unconstitutional in Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524
(1965), decided four years after petitioners' arrest. Pierson, 352 F.2d at 221. Even though the statute was presumptively valid at the time of the arrest, the court held that its subsequent invalidation and the Supreme Court's
holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), negated the police officers' assertion of good faith and probable
cause as defenses. Pierson, 352 F.2d at 221.
91. 11 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1943).
92. Pierson, 352 F.2d at 219.
93. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
94. Pierson, 352 F2d at 218.
95. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556 (1967). The police officers in Monroe asserted that their activities
were illegal so as to take them outside § 1983's requirement that the wrongdoer act under color of state law. Id.
The Court rejected this argument and refused to dismiss the action simply because the plaintiffs had failed to
plead that the police officers had specific intent to deprive them of their civil rights. Id. The Pierson Court stated
that the holding in Monroe did not intimate a view on what defenses might be available to the officers. Id.
96. Id. at 556-57.
97. Id. at 557.
98. Id. at 554.
99. John D. Kirby, Note, Qualified Immunityfor Civil Rights Violations:Refining the Standard,75 CORNELL L.
REv. 462, 464 (1990). For an overview of the historical origins of qualified immunity, see Richard A. Matasar,
Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court's Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REv. 741
(1987); Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement the New Standardfor Qualified Immunity
under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 901 (1984); see NAHMOD, supra note 74, at §§ 3-4; John F. Wagner, Jr.,
Annotation, Availability of Qualified Immunity Defense to Private Partiesin Action under 42 U.S. C. § 1983, 95
A.L.R. FED. 82 (1989).
100. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
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admits of no immunities."" 1 The Court stated in Imbler that prior § 1983 cases
must "be read in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses
rather than in derogation of them. 102
Seven years after Pierson was handed down, the Court again addressed the
qualified immunity issue in Scheuer v. Rhodes.103 In Scheuer, the Court narrowed
the class of officials entitled to absolute immunity. 04 The Court also refused to establish precise contours for qualified immunity:
[Tihe scope of... immunity will necessarily be related to facts ....Final resolu-

tion of this question must take into account the functions and responsibilities of [the
defendants in question] in their capacities as officers of the state government, as well
as the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.105

Just as the Courts in Pierson and Monroe had done, the Scheuer Court used a
historical backdrop for its decision.'0 6 In what would in later cases become a more
fully developed standard for qualified immunity, the Court stated that "[iut is the
existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all
the circumstances, coupled with good faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified
immunity ... "107 This holding suggested a dual criteria for qualified immunity.
The words "reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time" suggest an objective standard, while the words "good faith belief' suggest a subjective standard for
qualified immunity. 0
In Wood v. Strickland,0 9 the Court addressed the issue of whether an objective
or subjective qualified immunity standard applied to school board officials. Just as
it had with all prior qualified immunity decisions, the Wood Court found qualified
immunity and its common-law origins to be inextricably linked." 0 Addressing the
issue before the Court, Justice White stated that the appropriate standard for

101./d. at 417.
102. Id. at 418 (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)).
103. 416 U.S. 232 (1974). Scheuer was a § 1983 action which arose after Ohio National Guardsmen shot several students at Kent State University during an anti-Vietnam demonstration. Id. at 238.
104. Kirby, supra note 99, at 472-73. According to this commentator, by narrowing the class of public officials
entitled to invoke absolute immunity, the Court expanded the class of public officials entitled to invoke qualified
immunity. Kirby, supra note 99, at 472-73.
105. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 243.
106. Id. at 243-45.
107. Id. at 247-48. The ScheuerCourt held that qualified immunity, as enunciated in the opinion, applied to a
public official's discretionary acts. Id. The scope of the official's discretion and responsibilities would determine
the availability of qualified immunity. Id.
108. One commentator has noted that while Scheuer suggested an objective-subjective test for qualified immunity, the lower federal courts continued to apply varying standards. Gary S. Gildin, Immunizing Intentional
Violations of ConstitutionalRights Through JudicialLegislation: The Extension of Harlow v. Fitzgerald to Section
1983 Actions, 38 EMORY L.J. 369, 372 (1989).
109.420 U.S. 308 (1975).
110. Id. at 319-22.
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qualified immunity contains both objective and subjective elements.
White stated:

1

Justice

Such a standard imposes neither an unfair burden upon a person assuming a responsible public office requiring a high degree of intelligence and judgment for the
proper fulfillment of its duties, nor an unwarranted burden in light of the value
which civil rights have in our legal system. Any lesser standard would deny much of
the promise of§ 1983.112

While the holding in Wood was limited by the Court to school board officials, 1 3
the opinion set the tone for the application of qualified immunity in other contexts. 114 Justice Powell's dissenting opinion argued that the standard should be
wholly objective.115
The Court eschewed extending qualified immunity to municipalities sued under § 1983 in Owen v. City ofIndependence.11 ' Again, relying on the common law
as it existed at the time of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Court
stated:
In each of these cases [Procunier,Imbler, O'Connor, Wood, and Scheuer], our find-

ing of § 1983 immunity "was predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests
behind it." Where the immunity claimed by the defendant was well established at
common law at the time § 1983 was enacted, and where its rationale was compatible
with the purposes of the Civil Rights Act, we have construed the statute to incorporate that immunity.117
Until 1980, the Court had not addressed the issue of whether or not a private
party could be sued under § 1983.118 This was one of the issues which faced the

111.
Id. at 321. The appeals court had held the standard to be objective while the district court had initially
determined it to be a subjective standard. Id. The Court held: "[tlhe disagreement between the Court of Appeals
and the District Court over the immunity standard in this case has been put in terms of an 'objective' versus a
'subjective' test of good faith. As we see it, the appropriate standard necessarily contains elements of both." Id.
112. Id. at 322. This assessment is a balance of what Justice White says is "a standard of conduct based not only
on permissible intentions [subjective], but also on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights
[objective]. . . ."Id.
113. Id. at 319.
114. See Gildin, supra note 108, at 372.
115. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 329 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting). The Court adopted an objective
standard for qualified immunity in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 450 U.S. 800 (1982).
116.445 U.S. 622 (1980).
117. Id. at 638 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976)).
118. According to Professor Nahmod, befbre Dennis, most lower federal courts addressing the issue "conSee NAHMOD, supra note
cluded without much analysis that a private person did not act under color of law ....
74, at §2.10.

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGELA WREVIEW

[Vol. 14:127

Court in Dennis v. Sparks.1 9 The Court found that private parties are amenable to
suit under § 1983, despite the fact that the public official with whom they may
have conspired may be entitled to absolute immunity."' This, the Court held, is a
result of balancing the harms and benefits of allowing the private party to invoke
immunity. 121

The Court followed the objective-subjective test for qualified immunity until
the seminal case of Harlowv. Fitzgerald.22 In Harlow, the Court departed from its
past immunity jurisprudence and completely reformulated the qualified immunity
doctrine. 23 Harlow set the standard which the Court currently applies. 24 While
the Court narrowed the class of public officials entitled to invoke absolute immunity, it broadened protection under qualified immunity.12
In Harlow, the respondent Fitzgerald brought a Bivens action 26 against two
aides of then-President Nixon.127 In his suit, Fitzgerald alleged that petitioners

119. 449 U.S. 24 (1980). In Dennis, the. private party § 1983 defendant was sued for having allegedly conspired with a state judge to obtain an illegal injunction which prevented petitioner from producing minerals at its
oil lease sites. Id. at 25-26. After the injunction was invalidated by a state appellate court, the petitioner filed a
§ 1983 claim against the judge who issued the injunction and against the party who conspired with the judge to
obtain the injunction. Id. The petitioner claimed that he had been deprived of property without due process of
law. Id. at 26. The district court dismissed the action, holding that the judge was immune from suit because the
injunction was ajudicial act within the jurisdiction of the state court, and with the dismissal of the judge from the
action, the private defendant could not have been said to have acted under color of state law within the ambit of
§ 1983. Id. The court of appeals agreed with the district court with respect to the judge, but reversed with respect
to the private party. Id. The court of appeals held that there was no legal, policy, or logical reason to dismiss the
private party from the action simply because the immune judge was dismissed from the action. Id. at 27. The
Supreme Court held that private persons are amenable to suit for conspiring with state officials, and acting under
color of state law for § 1983 purposes. Id. at 29.
120. Id. at 30.
121. Id. at 31-32.
122. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Until Harlow, the Court continued to apply Woods objective-subjective test for
qualified immunity in a variety of contexts: Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (presidential aides);
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (prison officials); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)
(superintendent of state mental hospital). In Procunier,the Court extended qualified immunity to state prison
officials without undertaking a historical analysis of qualified immunity: "Furthermore, without purporting to
overrule or modify Wood, Procunier radically enlarged the circumstances under which an official would be
deemed to satisfy the objective test of qualified immunity." Gildin, supra note 108, at 373. See also NAHMOD,
supra note 74, at §§ 8.04, 8.09.
123. Harlow"completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common
law, replacing the inquiry into subjective malice. . . with an objective inquiry into the legal reasonableness of the
official action." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987).
124. The Harlow Court refined the qualified immunity standard in two important aspects. First, as the Court in
Scheuer had done, the Harlow Court further narrowed the class of public officials entitled to invoke absolute immunity. Second, the Court departed from Woods objective-subjective standard for qualified immunity, and announced a purely objective standard. See Kirby, supra note 99, at 474.
125. See Gildin, supra note 108, at 374.
126. Bivens actions are the § 1983 analog in suits against federal officials. The name is derived from the case of
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may sue federal officials for direct violations of their Fourth Amendment
rights. Id. at 397.
Since Bivens was decided, the Court has expanded its holding to allow plaintiffs to sue for other constitutional
violations. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (Eighth Amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
(1979) (Fifth Amendment).
127. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 802 (1982).
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entered into a conspiracy to have him dismissed from the Navy.12 Petitioner
Harlow claimed that no conspiracy existed and that all of his actions were taken in
good faith.129 The district court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss, and the
court of appeals affirmed. 30 Quoting Butz v. Economou, la1 the Court held that
" 'federal officials who seek absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an
exemption of that scope.' "132 Further, the Court held that "in general our cases
have followed a 'functional' approach to immunity law. We have recognized that
the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions require absolute immunity.
But this protectionhas extended nofurther than its justification would warrant."133
The Harlow Court recognized that claims against public officials are often
baseless and hurt not only the public official defendant, but also society by deterring qualified persons from accepting public office and by diverting public officials from their duties.134 According to the Court, such suits also carry a danger of
" 'dampen[ing] the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible
[public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.' ,135
The Court cited Butz v. Economou136 and Scheuer v. Rhodes 137 in recognizing
that the existing standard for qualified immunity - objective-subjective - was intended to allow for summary disposition of insubstantial claims. 13 It was for this
reason, the desire for summary disposition of insubstantial claims, that the
Harlow Court abandoned the subjective element of the test. 131 Inquiry into an official's subjective intent, the Court stated, "may entail broad-ranging discovery and

128. Id. at 802-04. Fitzgerald claimed that the respondents conspired to have him dismissed after it was
learned that he planned to blow the whistle on questionable purchasing practices. Id. at 804.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 806.

131. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
132. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 808 (1982) (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 506).
133. Id. at 810-11 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 814.
135. Id. (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)).
This rationale for qualified immunity would come to weigh heavily in the Court's denial of qualified immunity to
the private defendants in Wyatt.
136. 438 U.S. 506 (1978).
137. 416 U.S. 232, 245-48 (1974).
138. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
139. Id. at 815-16. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, stated that the subjective element has often proven
to be
incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for summary judgment. And an official's subjective good faith has been considered to
be a question of fact that some courts have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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the deposing of numerous persons, including an official's professional colleagues.
Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government."'"
The Court reasoned that an objective standard of conduct would better fulfill
the dual objectives of qualified immunity: avoiding disruption of government and
allowing summary disposition of insubstantial claims. 141
The Harlow Court took a two step approach to qualified immunity.142 First, the
Court stated that the defendant, prior to successfully asserting qualified immunity,
must establish that he or she did not violate a constitutional or statutory right
which was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Second, the
inquiry turns to whether a reasonable person would have known of the clearly established right, which involves an objective inquiry into the public official defendant's actions.'" If the constitutional or statutory right was not clearly established
at the time of the alleged violation, or if the right was clearly established but a reasonable person in the public official's position would not have known this, then
the defendant official may sucessfully assert qualified immunity and avoid liability.
Additionally, the Court retained some vestiges of the subjective prong, notwithstanding its adoption of a pure objective standard.1 45 This subjective element
retained by the Harlow Court was referred to in the opinion as "extraordinary circumstances."1 4 6 "Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew [a subjective
determination] nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the defense
should be sustained. 1 47

140. Id.
at 817. The Court stated:
"We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency in this jurisdiction and throughout
the country plaintiffs are filing suits seeking damage awards against high government officials in their
personal capacities based on alleged constitutional torts. Each such suit almost invariably results in these
officials and their colleagues being subjected to extensive discovery into traditionally protected areas,
such as their deliberations preparatory to the formulation of government policy and their intimate thought
processes and communications .. . .Such discover [sic] is wide-ranging, time-consuming, and not
without considerable cost to the officials involved. It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiffs counsel to
create a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker's mental processes are involved. . . .The effect of this development
upon the willingness of individuals to serve their country is obvious."
Id. at 817 n.29 (alteration in original) (quoting Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(Gesell, J., concurring), aff'd in pertinentpartby an equally divided court, 452 U.S. 713 (1981)).
141. Id. For further analysis of Harlow, see Gildin, supra note 108, at 377-79; Gary W Herschman, The D.C.
Circuit: Qualified Immunity. InterpretingHarlow and its Progeny, 56 GEO.WASH. L. REv. 1047 (1988); Kirby,
supra note 99, at 474-76.
142. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817.
143. Id. at 818.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 819.
146. Id.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
A reasonable reading seems to be that the official can claim immunity-even for a violation of a clearly
established right- if he can prove both that he did not know he was committing that violation, and that
due to some unique circumstance he should not reasonably have been expected to know he was committing it.

Kirby, supr note 99, at 475 n.99.
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As a procedural matter, qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which
must be affirmatively pled by the public official defendant. 148 In Siegert v.
Gilley, 149 the Court held that once a defendant has asserted qualified immunity in a
motion for summary judgment, the judge may inquire into the law of the substantive counts of the plaintiffs claim and determine " 'whether the law was clearly
established at the time an action occurred . .

.

.Until this threshold immunity

question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed."' 15 0 This is consistent with
the Court's admonition that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial. 5
With the objective standard for qualified immunity in place, the Court embarked on a new line of qualified immunity cases under the Harlow standard.
These cases applied the Harlow standard to § 1983 actions. 2
The Court applied the Harlow objective test for qualified immunity to a § 1983
action in Davis v. Scherer." 3 In Davis, the Court stated Harlow had rejected the
notion that an inquiry into the state of mind of the defendant was a requisite to
pleading a prima facie case under § 1983 and that instead the focus should be
placed on the objective reasonableness of the defendant's actions. 5 4 In Malley v.
Briggs,"'5 a § 1983 action, 56 the Court denied a police officer's assertion of

148. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980); FED. R.
Civ. P. 8(c).
149. 111 S.Ct. 1789(1991).
150. Id. at 1793 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).
151. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 506, 507-08 (1978); Hanrahan v.
Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 765 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
152. Harlow was a Bivens action. See supra note 126. The Court left the door open to the application of the new
objective test to state officials sued in § 1983 actions in footnote 30 of the opinion:
This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity available to state officials sued for
constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have found previously, however, that it would be
"untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials [Bivens actions]."
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.30 (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 504).
153. 468 U.S. 183 (1984). With this holding, the Court followed its reasoning in footnote 30 of Harlow where
the Court stated that, for purposes of immunity law, there is no distinction between Bivens actions brought
against federal officials and § 1983 suits brought against state officials. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 n.30 (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 504).
154. Davis, 468 U.S. at 191.
155. 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
156. While Harlow was a suit against federal and not state officials, the Malley Court held that "as we stated in
deciding the case [Harlow], it is 'untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits
brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials.'" Id. at 340 n.2 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.30 (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 504)).
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absolute immunity but instead allowed the officer to assert Harlow's objectively
determined qualified immunity. 7
In Mitchell v. Forsyth,"'8 the Supreme Court further shaped the contours of
qualified immunity. 19 The Mitchell Court held that qualified immunity is immunity from suit and not a defense.' 0 Citing Harlow's admonition that insubstantial
claims should not proceed to trial, the Court in Mitchell held that qualified immunity is "effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial."' 6' With
this, the Court also held that a denial of a public official's motion for summary
judgment, based on an assertion of qualified immunity, should be immediately reviewable'62 through an interlocutory appeal.' 63
Mitchell is significant in one other respect. The Court held that for qualified immunity to be successfully asserted, the public official must not have violated
rights that were clearly establishedat the time of the alleged violation."1 8

157. Id. at 342. The Court noted that an allegation of subjective bad faith- malice - will not defeat a defendant's assertion of qualified immunity so long as the defendant acted as a reasonable person would have. Id. at 343.
One commentator is critical of the Court's extension of qualified immunity to state officials sued under § 1983.
Gildin, supra note 108, at 383. "Apart from the flawed logic that underlies the Court's application of Harlow to
section 1983, extension of the new immunity contravenes the Court's settled holdings that immunity under section 1983 is founded in the common law." Gildin, supra note 108, at 383; see also Matasar, supra note 99, at 78687. Professor Matasar is critical of the Court having adopted qualified immunity from the common law in
Pierson in the first instance. He states that such an adoption "treat[s] the broadly expansionist views of the
Reconstruction Congress as irrelevant to the question of the availability of immunities, and. . . disregard[s] actual statements of legislators who believed immunities had been abrogated." Matasar, supra note 99, at 786.
Professor Matasar asserts that the Court's adoption of qualified immunity is not only historically unfounded in
the common law, but is a "mask for its policymaking." Matasar,supra note 99, at 744.
158. 472 U.S. 511 (1985). The plaintiff in Mitchell brought a Bivens action against former United States
Attorney General John Mitchell for a warrantless wiretapping of the plaintiffs phone. Id. at 513.
159. Id. at 526-27.
160. Id. at 526.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 526-27. The courts of appeals are conferred with jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292.
163. Id. at 527. As support for holding that a denial of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage of
litigation should be immediately appealable, the Court noted that the reasons for allowing interlocutory appeals
are compatible with the purposes of qualified immunity. Id. (citations omitted). The opinion states: "An appealable interlocutory decision must satisfy two. . . criteria: it must 'conclusively determine the disputed question,'
and that question must involve a 'clai[m] of right. . . collateral to, rights asserted in the action.' "Id. (citations
omitted) (alteration in original).
An assertion of qualified immunity, if successful, will "conclusively determine[] the disputed question" and is
"a claim of rights. . . collateral to" the plaintiffs civil rights action. Qualified immunity is thus cast in terms of
immunity from suit. "[Q]ualified immunity is in part an entitlement not to be forced to litigate the consequences
of official conduct that a claim of immunity is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff's claim that his
rights have been violated." Id. at 527-28. The Court further stated that if the plaintiffs claim is erroneously allowed to go to trial against a valid assertion of qualified immunity, the defendant's qualified immunity is effectively lost. Id.
164. Id. at 530. See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This harkens back to Pierson v. Ray
in which the Court held that the defendant police officers should not be held liable for violating the plaintiffs'
constitutional rights where the right was not clearly establishedat the time of the violation. Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 555 (1962).

1993l

SECTION 1983 LITIGATION

In Anderson v. Creighton,16 the Court recognized its departure from the common law with respect to qualified immunity.166 Justice Scalia stated:
[W]e have never suggested that the precise contours of official immunity can and
should be slavishly derived from the often arcane rules of the common law. That notion is plainly contradicted by Harlow, where the Court completely reformulated
qualified immunity alongprinciplesnot at all embodied in the common law. ... '67

With Anderson, the Court's qualified immunity standard was firmly embedded
in both policy and the common law.
B. The Split in the Circuit Courts ofAppeal
on the Availability of QualifiedImmunity
to Private Party § 1983 Defendants
1. Qualified Immunity Held Available to Private § 1983 Defendants: The Fifth,
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
In Folsom Investment Co. v. Moore, 8 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals faced
the question of whether a private defendant, facing § 1983 litigation, may invoke
qualified immunity.169 Folsom arose from a disputed real estate transaction. 7
Plaintiff Moore initiated a state court attachment proceeding against property held
by Folsom Investment Company.171 After the writ of attachment was issued,
Folsom moved to have the writ dissolved alleging that it had been illegally obtained.172 Upon completion of the state court proceedings, Folsom filed claims in
Moore had acted under color of
federal district court against Moore alleging that
173
law in wrongfully attaching Folsom's property.
The Fifth Circuit, sua sponte, directed the parties' attention to Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co. ,174 which was pending before the Supreme Court.175 After
Lugar was decided by the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit held that under Lugar,
Folsom had pled a prima facie case under § 1983 "insofar as Folsom. . . alleged
that the Louisiana attachment scheme is violative of the Constitution, the private
parties who set that scheme in motion acted under color of state law." 176 As such,

165. 483 U.S. 635 (1987). Anderson was a Bivens claim against an FBI agent for searching the plaintiffs home
without a warrant. Id. at 637.
166. Id. at 646 (emphasis added). This portion of the Anderson opinion is inconsistent with other Courts' rationale: "Section 1983 immunities are 'predicatedupon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law. . . .' "Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914,920 (1984) (emphasis added)
(quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529 (1984)). See also
supra note 157.
167. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 645 (emphasis added).
168. 681 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1982).
169. Id. at 1037.
170. Id. at 1033.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1036.
173. Folsom Inv. Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032, 1034 (5th Cir. 1982).
174. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
175. Folsom, 681 F.2d at 1033.
176. Id. at 1037.
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the Fifth Circuit held that Moore had acted under color of law for purposes of
§ 1983.177 However, the Folsom court also noted that in footnote twenty-three of
Lugar, the Supreme Court left the door open for a private § 1983 defendant to invoke a good faith or qualified immunity.178
The court seized the opportunity to allow Folsom to invoke qualified immunity
on remand. 17 9 The court reasoned:
The reasons for conferring such an immunity are obvious. The Louisiana legislature, in enacting the attachment legislation at issue here, conferred a commonlygranted statutory right on qualified litigants. To hold that a private party may be
subject to constitutional tort damages for invoking in good faith presumptively valid
legislation later held to be unconstitutional would be to visit the effects of unconstitutional action by the legislature on innocent citizens.'
The court then proceeded to recognize the proper immunity standard to be that
enunciated in Harlow.' In adopting qualified immunity for private parties facing
§ 1983 litigation, the court undertook a historical analysis of the common law defense of probable cause to the torts of malicious prosecution and wrongful attachment. 18 2 "The most important justification [for a probable cause defense] is that a
citizen should not be penalized for resorting to the courts to vindicate rights he in
good faith has probable cause to believe are his." 8 3 The court justified its finding
that qualified immunity should be available to Folsom by noting that the probable
cause defense, as it existed at common law, was transformed by Congress into an
immunity with § 1983's passage."
In Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 8 ' the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of the
availability of qualified immunity to private party § 1983 defendants. In Jones, the
plaintiff contracted with Preuit & Mauldin to repair farm equipment. 88 After
Jones failed to pay for the repairs, Preuit & Mauldin filed a mechanic's lien and
writ of attachment on Jones' farm equipment.18 7 Jones then filed a § 1983 suit challenging the constitutionality of the prejudgment attachment procedure. 188 The district court held that Preuit & Mauldin had acted in good faith reliance on the
attachment statute as the statute was not clearly unconstitutional. 8 ' Citing
Anderson v. Creighton, 9 ' the court held that so long as Preuit & Mauldin had

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 1036-37.
Id. at 1037 (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942 n.23). For the text of footnote 23, see supra note 6.
Folsom, 681 F2d at 1038.
Id.
at 1037.
Id. at 1037. See supra notes 122-47 and accompanying text.
Folsom, 681 F.2dat 1038.
Id.

Id.
851 F.2d 1321 (1lth Cir. 1988), vacatedon othergrounds,489 U.S. 1002 (1989).
at 1322.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 1323.
Id.
483 U.S. 635 (1987); see supra note 165.
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known to be
reasonably and in good faith relied on a statute they could not have
191
immunity.
qualified
invoke
to
entitled
were
they
unconstitutional,
Following the Supreme Court's lead, the Jones court analyzed the history of the
common law to find qualified immunity available to Preuit & Mauldin. 192 The
court found that the existence of the good faith and probable cause defenses to the
common law action of wrongful attachment at the time of § 1983's passage justified extending qualified immunity to Preuit & Mauldin. 193 The court also outlined
the policy reasons for affording qualified immunity to the private party defendant."' "When a citizen undertakes in good faith to utilize a proceeding at law provided by his state legislature, he should do so with confidence that he need not fear
liability resulting from the legislature's constitutional error of which he was unaware." 1 9' Finally, the court traced the Supreme Court's cases dealing with wrongful attachment, replevin, and garnishment in light of Harlow in justifying their
extension of qualified immunity to a private party.19 The Jones court began this
discussion by noting footnote twenty-three of Lugar.197 The court felt that the
Supreme Court had strongly implied in Lugar that qualified immunity should be
available to private defendants. 19' The court cited Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp. ,199 Fuentes v. Shevin,2"' Mitchell v. W T Grant Co. ,2o and North Georgia

FinishingCo. v. Di-Chem, Inc. ," - Supreme Court attachment, replevin, and garnishment cases -in concluding that Preuit & Mauldin had no reason to know that
it was "violating any clearly established constitutional rights."" 3 Thus, the court

191. Jonesv. Preuit&Mauldin, 851 F2d 1321, 1323-24 (1 lthCir. 1988), vacated on othergrounds, 489U.S.
1002 (1989).
192. Id. at 1324-25.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1327.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1325-27. The Jones court cited Supreme Court decisions in which the Court had struck down state
attachment, replevin, and garnishment statutes as being violative of due process. Id. See North Ga. Finishing v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (Georgia prejudgment attachment statute); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600 (1974) (prejudgment attachment statute); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (Florida and
Pennsylvania replevin statutes); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (Wisconsin prejudgment
garnishment statute). In each of these cases, the Supreme Court held that the party sued under § 1983 had relied
on statutes that they could reasonably have presumed valid. Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321, 1327-28
(11 th Cir. 1988), vacatedon othergrounds, 489 U.S. 1002 (1989). This reasonable reliance, the court held, entitled Preuit & Mauldin to invoke qualified immunity. Id. at 1328.
It is interesting to note that Judge Tjoflat, in a concurring opinion, stated:
I perceive no... way to explain satisfactorily the case law concerning section 1983 immunities ...
The Supreme Court's pronouncements on immunities law in section 1983 context, I submit, show an interest not in slavishly following common law immunity doctrines, but in preserving the balance of interests that those doctrines struck.
Id. at 1334-35 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring) (footnotes omitted).
197. Jones, 851 F.2d at 1325 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 942 n.23 (1982)).
198. Id.
199. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
200.407 U.S. 67 (1972).
201. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
202. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
203. Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321, 1327 (11 th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 489 U.S.
1002 (1989).
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found that Preuit & Mauldin could successfully assert Harlow's objectively determined qualified immunity.204
In Buller v. Buechler,2"' the Eighth Circuit found qualified immunity available
to a private § 1983 defendant.2 6 The court's opinion stated that qualified immunity for private defendants had roots in the common law.2" 7 Citing the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in Folsom Investment Co. v. Moore, the court extended Harlow
objective immunity to a private party sued under § 1983 for invoking a state garnishment procedure declared unconstitutional by a federal district court.208 The
court reasoned that public policy dictated allowing citizens to rely on presumptively valid state statutes without fear of being subjected to constitutional tort lia20 9
bility.
In De Vargas v. Mason & Hanger-SilasMason Co. ,210 the Tenth Circuit held that
where a private defendant was merely acting pursuant to contractual obligations
and is sued for those actions under § 1983, the defendant is entitled to invoke qualified immunity. 211 To deny such a defendant qualified immunity, the court held,
would be to place the defendant "between Scylla and Charybdis. 212 The defendant
is faced with either performing under the contract, thus facing constitutional litigation, or facing a breach of contract action in order to avoid the constitutional liti213
gation.
2. Qualified Immunity Held Unavailable to Private Defendants in § 1983
Litigation: The First and Ninth Circuits
In Downs v. Sawtelle, 214 the First Circuit considered extending qualified immunity to a private defendant in a § 1983 action. 215 Downs involved a § 1983 action
for damages by the appellant Downs, a deaf mute mother of two, against her
guardian Sawtelle, who also happened to be her sister. 216 In her complaint, Downs
alleged that Sawtelle and a defendant hospital had conspired to "sterilize her
against her will, to delay her marriage to her present husband, and to remove her
second child from her custody, all in violation of her constitutional rights. "217 The

204. Ad.
205. 706 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1983).

206. Id. at 850.
207.Id. at 850-51.
208. Id. (citing Folsom Inv. Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032, 1037 (5th Cir. 1982)).
209. Id. at 851. The Eighth Circuit affirmed its holding in Buller in Watertown Equipment Co. v. Norwest Bank
Watertown, 830 F.2d 1487 (8th Cir. 1987).
210. 844 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1074 (1991).
211. Id. at 717.
212. Scylla and Charybdis are based on Greek mythology and mean to be placed in a position where avoidance
of one danger exposes one to destruction by another. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1057 (Scylla)
(1988).
213. DeVargas, 844 F.2d at 722.
214. 574 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978). Downs was a pre-Lugar, pre-Harlowcase.
215. Id. at 10.
216. Id. at 3-4.
217. Id. at3.
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court refused to recognize qualified immunity in such a context.2" 8 After reviewing the Supreme Court's historical and policy reasons for extending qualified immunity, the court held that "[t]o place this court's imprimatur upon an immunity in
favor of a private individual could in many instances work to eviscerate the fragile
protection of individual liberties afforded by [§ 1983] .,219
The court further noted that the rationale for extending qualified immunity to
public officials is simply not applicable to private defendants.22 "Private parties
simply are not confronted with the pressures of office, the often split-second decisionmaking or the constant threat of liability facing police officers, governors,
and other public officials. "221 With this, the court held that the fairness of affording qualified immunity is outweighed by the intent of § 1983 -providing a remedy
to those who have had their constitutional rights violated.222
The Ninth Circuit had occasion to address the issue of qualified immunity in a
private party § 1983 context in Howerton v. Gabica.22' The court in Howerton dismissed qualified immunity in a private party context in a footnote. 224 "[T]here is
no good faith immunity under section 1983 for private parties who act under color
of state law to deprive an individual of his or her constitutional rights. 225
The Ninth Circuit revisited the question in Conner v. SantaAna. 22' Again, in a
footnote, the Ninth Circuit disposed of an assertion of qualified immunity by a
private party in a § 1983 action.227
3. The Sixth Circuit's Different Approach
In Duncan v. Peck,228 the Sixth Circuit neither adopted nor rejected qualified
immunity, but instead set forth a good faith defense distinct from the Supreme
Court's Harlow standard.22 9 In Duncan, Peck sued Duncan under § 1983 for attaching Peck's property under an Ohio statute later declared unconstitutional by
the Ohio Supreme Court. 23 Citing footnote twenty-three of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Lugar,231 the court stated:
[A] close examination of the Supreme Court's language offers the possibility of some
sort of defense from liability to private individuals, and does not necessarily suggest
the specific defense of immunity. In any case, Lugar did not change the Supreme

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 15-16.
708 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 380 n. 10 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 942 n.23 (1982)).
Id.
897 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990).
Id. at 1492 n.9. "[P]rivate parties. . . are not entitled to the qualified immunity defense." Id.
844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1267-68.
Id. at 1262.
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
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Court's requirement that defendants must show both2 a32historical basis, and strong
policy reasons to be eligible for good faith immunity.
Further, the court stated that the Supreme Court's opinion in Forrester v.
White 3 supported denying qualified immunity to private § 1983 defendants.234
"As the ForresterCourt points out, the law does not immunize other private parties
from suit, no matter how frivolous the claim may be." 235 According to the Duncan
court, the circuits affording private defendants qualified immunity have confused
immunities with defenses.2 36 The opinion stated that an immunity is based on an
objective standard, while a good faith defense has subjective elements. 237
After expounding on the inconsistencies of the other courts of appeals' immunity jurisprudence, the Duncan court eschewed the Harlow standard and instead
found a subjective good faith defense to be the appropriate defense for private
§ 1983 defendants .238 The Duncancourt held that such a defense would protect private parties who in good faith rely on advice of counsel in invoking presumptively
valid state statutes.23 Accordingly, to overcome such a subjective good faith defense, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with malice and without probable cause. 240
III. Wyatt v. Cole
By the time Wyatt v. Cole was decided, the Court's immunity jurisprudence had
developed a wholly objective standard for qualified immunity.24 Until Wyatt was
decided, however, the Court had yet to address the issue of the availability of qualified immunity to private individuals facing § 1983 litigation.
Writing for a six-to-three majority, Justice O'Connor held that qualifiedimmunity is not available to private § 1983 defendants.2 42 Justice O'Connor began the
opinion by noting the split among the circuit courts of appeal on the issue. 2"

232. Duncan, 844 F.2d at 1265 (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942 n.23).
233. 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
234. Duncan, 844 F.2d at 1264 (citing Forrester,484 U.S. at 219).
235. Id. at 1265.
236. Id. at 1266.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1267.
[I]f we were to endorse qualified immunity for private parties, and to apply the immunity as the Supreme
Court instructed in Harlow, not only would we be improperly extending the immunity doctrine far beyond its underlying rationales, but we would also be significantly distorting the common law defenses to
malicious prosecution and wrongful attachment torts by substituting an objective test for good faith for
the common law's subjective standard.
Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See supra notes 122-47 and accompanying text.
242. Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1834 (1992).
243. See id. at 1829-30; see also supra notes 168-240 and accompanying text.
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The Court's opinion quoted the language of § 1983, the statute under which
Wyatt arose. 2 " Citing Lugar,241 Justice O'Connor then approved the district court's
findings that respondents Cole and Robbins had acted under color of state law
within the contemplation of § 1983.246 Justice O'Connor noted that the Lugar
Court had held that "private parties who attached a debtor's assets pursuant to a
state attachment statute were subject to § 1983 liability if the statute was constitutionally infirm. 247 Based on the holding in Lugar, the district court had held that
"Cole, by invoking the state statute, had acted under color of state law within the
meaning of § 1983, and was therefore liable for damages for the deprivation of
Wyatt's due process rights."2" Justice O'Connor noted that both the district court
and the Fifth Circuit had held that both Cole and Robbins were nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity despite the deprivation of Wyatt's due process rights. 249
Justice O'Connor briefly reviewed the Supreme Court's immunity jurisprudence.25 0 Justice O'Connor noted that there was insufficient common law support
to extend qualified immunity to Cole and Robbins. 25 '
fyatt, in a departure from prior Supreme Court immunity cases' emphasis on
common law history, focused more on the policy considerations in denying Cole
and Robbins qualified immunity.2 2 Cole and Robbins had argued that the common
law supported extension of qualified immunity to a private party context. 253 They
also argued that policy considerations strongly supported their assertion of immunity. 2 4 Justice O'Connor rejected these arguments under the rationale that the policy reasons for extending qualified immunity to public officials simply did not
have a sufficient nexus to justify extending qualified immunity to private

244. ffyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1830. See supra note 5 for the text of § 1983.
245. See supra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
246. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1830. See also the district court opinion reported at 710 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Miss.
1989).
247. Wan, 112 S. Ct. at 1830.
248. Id. See supra notes 19-20.
249. Wyatt, 112 S.Ct. at 1830.
250. Id. at 1831-34. See also supra notes 241-48 and accompanying text.
251. Wyatt, 112 S.Ct. at 1832.
252. Id. at 1833. Justice O'Connor stated that "private parties hold no office requiring them to exercise discretion; nor are they principally concerned with enhancing the public good." Id.
253. Respondents' Brief at 9-11, Wyatt (No. 91-126). In their brief, Cole and Robbins argued that a historical
inquiry into the common law has been made unnecessary by the Supreme Court. Id at 9. "Justice Scalia wrote
. . .'we have never suggested that the precise contours of immunity can and should be slavishly derived from the
often arcane rules of the common law.'" Id. (citation omitted). In the alternative Cole and Robbins argued that the
common law supported their assertion of immunity. Id. at 9-11. They further argued that the common law defense of good faith to malicious prosecution and wrongful attachment, which at common law could be asserted by
private defendants, is analogous to qualified immunity. Id.
254. Id. at 11-15. Citing the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, Cole and Robbins argued
that a citizen should be able to invoke presumptively valid state statutes without fear of suit for using those statutes. Id. at 11-12. See Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321, 1325 (1 1th Cir. 1988), vacated on other
grounds, 489 U.S. 1002 (1989); see also notes 185-204 and accompanying text.
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individuals.2"' Citing Butz v. Economou2 6 and Wood v. Strickland,257 Justice
O'Connor stated that private parties hold no public office requiring them to make
discretionary decisions in furthering, the public good.2"8 Further, Justice
O'Connor held that the public good would not be impaired if private individuals
are denied immediately appealable, objectively determined qualified immu259
nity.
Justice O'Connor also stated that history counseled against extending qualified
immunity to private parties:
Even if there were sufficient common law support to conclude that respondents, like
the police officers in Pierson, should be entitled to a good-faith defense, that would
still not entitle them to what they sought and obtained in the courts below: the
qualified immunity
from suit accorded government officials under Harlow v.
260
Fitzgerad.

After setting forth the Court's holding, Justice O'Connor, in dicta, stated:
In so holding, however, we do not foreclose the possibility that private defendants
faced with § 1983 liability under Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. could be entitled to an
affirmative defense based on good faith and/or probable cause or that § 1983 suits
against private, rather than governmental, parties could require plaintiffs to carry
additional burdens. 261

Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Scalia joined.262
Justice Kennedy took a historical approach in reaching the conclusion that the
common law offered no support for extending qualified immunity in a private
party context. 263 "Both the Court and the dissent recognize that our original decisions recognizing defenses and immunities to suits brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 rely on analogous limitations existing in the common law when § 1983 was
enacted."264

255. ffatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1833. Speaking of the rationale for extending qualified immunity to public officials,
Justice O'Connor stated:
These rationales are not transferable to private parties. Although principles of equality and fairness may
suggest, as respondents argue, that private citizens who rely unsuspectingly on state laws they did not
create and may have no reason to believe are invalid should have some protection from liability, as do
their government counterparts, such interests are not sufficiently similar to the traditional purposes of
qualified immunity to justify such an expansion.

Id.
256. 438 U.S. 478 (1978); see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
257. 420 U.S. 308 (1975); see supranotes 109-15 and accompanying text.
258. 14att, 112 S. Ct. at 1833 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 319 (1975)).
259. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1833-34.
260. Id. at 1832 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)).
261. id. at 1834 (citation omitted).
262. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1835. "Our immunity doctrine is rooted in historical analogy, based on the existence of commonlaw rules in 1871, rather than in 'freewheeling policy choice[s]' "Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
342 (1986)).
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Citing Harlow, the concurring opinion noted that the transformation from a
subjective-objective standard to an objective test for qualified immunity was "justified by the special policy concerns arising from public officials' exposure to repeated suits."26 Justice Kennedy disagreed with the Chief Justice's argument in
dissent that the similar policy considerations dictated extending qualified immunity to private defendants.

26

Noting the aim of the objective test for qualified immunity," 7 Justice Kennedy
stated that since the burden of proof on the defendant's knowledge of the invalidity
of a statute rests with the plaintiff, the "question may be resolved on summary
judgment if the plaintiff cannot come forward with facts from which bad faith can
28
be inferred.""
Moreover, the concurring opinion in Wyatt stated that a § 1983 defendant
should be able to argue that he acted in subjective good faith reliance on a statute,
regardless of whether a reasonable person would have so relied.269
Justice Kennedy stated that by casting the defense as an immunity, the implication is that the conduct giving rise to a suit under § 1983 was unlawful but that the
defendant should be exonerated nonetheless if he acted as a reasonable person.27
This, Justice Kennedy wrote, is inconsistent "where a private citizen may have
acted in good-faith reliance on a statute."27' Justice Kennedy further noted that
subjective good faith may be difficult to prove in the face of a showing that no reasonable person would have acted as the defendant did. 272
Noting the distinction in the common law action of malicious prosecution between subjective and objective bad faith, Justice Kennedy's concurrence stated
that "private individual's reliance on a statute, prior to a judicial determination of
unconstitutionality, is considered reasonable as a matter of law; therefore under
the circumstances of this case,273lack of probable cause can only be shown through
proof of subjective bad faith.
Significantly, Justice Kennedy stated:
Though it might later be determined that there is not a triable issue of fact to save the
plaintiff s case ... on remand it ought to be open to him at least in theory to argue

that the defendant's bad faith eliminates any reliance on the statute,just as it ought to

265. Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 1835 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 813-14 (1982)).
266. Id.
267. The objective criteria was adopted in Harlow so that insubstantial claims would not proceed to trial. The
subjective element dismissed in Harlow raised factual questions not testable at the summary judgment stage of
litigation.
Citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), Justice Kennedy stated that subjective bad faith may
now be tested on a motion for summary judgment. 14att, 112 S. Ct. at 1835 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
268. Id.
at 1837.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1836.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1837 (citation omitted).
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be open to the defendant to show goodfaith even if some construct
of a reasonableman
274
in the defendant's position would have acted in a different way.

Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined in dissent by Justices Souter and Thomas. 271
The Chief Justice stated that the two requirements for qualified immunity in
§ 1983 actions, as announced by the Court in previous decisions, were satisfied by
the facts of

W5yatt.

2 76

The dissent stated that the majority erroneously found that a good faith defense
was not available to private parties at common law at the time § 1983 was
adopted.277 Moreover, the Chief Justice stated that the availability of such a good
faith defense at common law supported extending qualified immunity to private
defendants in § 1983 actions.2 78 "I am at a loss to understand what is accomplished
by today's decision -other than a needlessly fastidious adherence to nomenclature- given that the Court acknowledges that a good-faith defense will be available for respondents to assert on remand."279

The dissent further argued that this is logically inconsistent since probable
cause- respondents' reliance on the replevin statute-is an objective inquiry-

precisely the standard for qualified immunity established by Harlow.280 Accordingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that since probable cause -the common law
defense which the Chief Justice argued supported the extension of qualified immunity to private parties - is an objective inquiry and ordinarily a question of law, the
defense of subjective good-faith should be an appropriate inquiry for summary
judgment.281
Further, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion argued that public policy
dictated extending qualified immunity to the respondents.282 "In denying immunity to those who reasonably rely on presumptively valid state law, and thereby
discouraging such reliance, the Court expresses confidence that today's decision
will not 'unduly impai[r]' the public interest."283

274. Id. (emphasis added).
275. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
276. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court has extended qualified immunity in two circumstances.
Id. "The first is when a similarly situated defendant would have enjoyed an immunity at common law at the time
§ 1983 was adopted. The second is when important public policy concerns suggest the need for an immunity." Id.
277. Id. at 1838 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 (1986); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
318(1975)).
278. Id.
279. Id. "Respondents presumably will be required to show the traditional elements of a good-faith defenseeither that they acted without malice or that they acted with probable cause." Id. (citations omitted).
280. Id. at 1839.
281. Id.
Nor do I see any reason that this "defense" [subjective good faith defensel may not be asserted early in
the proceedings on a motion for summary judgment, just as a claim to qualified immunity may be. Provided that the historical facts are not in dispute, the presence or absence of "probable cause" has long
been acknowledged to be a question of law.
Id. (citations omitted).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1839-40.
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Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Court's immunity jurisprudence had "gone very far afield" when private parties are exposed to greater risk
than public officials when § 1983's "historic purpose was 'to prevent state officials
from using the cloak of their authority under state law to violate rights protected
against state infringement.'
"284

IV. ANALYSIS
The Court's immunity jurisprudence has been both erratic and uneven.28 The
Court has often decided immunity cases based on policy rather than precedential
considerations.286 Further, the Court's qualified immunity decisions have often

been inextricably linked to the Court's absolute immunity cases. 287
The holding in Wyatt is best understood by viewing it from two perspectives:
common law history and public policy.
A. The Wyatt Court's HistoricalAnalysis
of QualifiedImmunity
The Wyatt decision was based on two grounds: First, the lack of common law
support for extending qualified immunity to a private defendant,288 and second,
the policy considerations militating against extending qualified immunity to private defendants.289 Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion articulates a more balanced and tenable rationale for denying immunity to private defendants. The Chief
Justice's dissent sets forth some of the best policy reasons for extending immunity
to private parties facing § 1983 litigation; however, the dissent also makes some
questionable inferential leaps from the common law in its opinion.

284. Id. (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 948 (1982)).
285. Compare Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (qualified immunity necessarily contains both
subjective and objective criteria), with Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982) (adopting a wholly objective standard).
CompareImbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976) (noting any extension of qualified immunity must be
based "upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law
. . ."); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914,920 (1984) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421 with approval) with Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,645 (1987) ("[W]e have never suggested that the precise contours of official immunity can and should be slavishly derived from the often arcane rules of the common law. That notion is plainly
contradicted by Harlow, where the Court completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all
embodied in the common law. .. ").
286. See cases cited at supra note 285. In the first case in which the Court recognized a good-faith defense
(qualified immunity), Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), the Court was without precedential support forits
holding. Instead of relying on precedent, the Court cited public policy and fairness as support for adopting a good
faith defense. "A policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being charged with dereliction of
duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does." Id. at 555.
In Harlow, the Court "completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the
common law. . . ." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987).

Harlow was a break from precedent too. "Decisions of this Court have established that the 'good faith' defense
has both an 'objective' and 'subjective' aspect. . . .The subjective element of the good faith defense frequently
has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial."
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-16 (citations omitted).
287. See Kirby, supra note 99, at 472.
288. Wyatt v.Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1832 (1992).
289. Id. at 1833-34.
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Justice O'Connor begins her historical analysis in Hyatt by reiterating the
Court's finding in Imbler that "[s]ection 1983 'creates a species of tort liability that
on its face admits of no immunities.' "290 Against this backdrop, the Court then
stated that if a defendant were afforded a defense at common law at the time of the
enactment of § 1983,291 the Court will extend the same defense or immunity to
similarly situated defendants.292 Justice O'Connor then stated, however, that "irrespective of the common law support, we will not recognize an immunity available
at common law if§ 1983's history or purpose counsel against applying it in § 1983
actions."' '9 This, better than any other portion of the opinion, illustrates the

Court's convenient and disjointed use of the history in the immunity cases leading
up to and culminating with Wyatt.
The majority opinion, while reaching the correct conclusion, continues a tradition of form over substance which has been pervasive in the Court's immunity decisions. 9'
Wyatt illustrates the disparate treatment the Court has given qualified immunity. The Court's opinion uses policy considerations in holding that the common
law offers no support to respondents' assertion of qualified immunity.29' Here, the
opinion mixes apples and oranges: the common law history used by the Court in
first recognizing qualified immunity in Pierson, and the policy considerations
used by it in subsequent cases to expand the immunity doctrine. In past qualified
immunity cases, the Court used both the common law and public policy in evaluating any assertion of qualified immunity; however, the Court treated the two
290. d. at 1831 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976)).
291. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
292. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1831.
293. d. (citing Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914,920 (1984); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424-29).
294. One commentator is highly critical of the Court's reliance on history in reaching its immunity decisions.
He argues that history should not be dispositive of the question:
[Tihe Court's immunity decisions are not historically compelled; rather, they represent the Court's
choice among competing plausible histories ....
The Court need not be hesitant to forthrightly announce that history does not determine if immunities
are encompassed in section 1983. The Court has ample common law power to define the scope of section
1983. However, if the Court frees itself from its trumped up history-as-congressional-choice methodology, the Court can discuss the relative merits of retaining or abrogating common law immunities.
Matasar, supr note 99, at 795 (footnote omitted).
295. Justice O'Connor drew on the distinction between a defense available at common law, and an immunity:
Even if there were sufficient common law support to conclude that respondents. . . should be entitled to
a good-faith defense, that would still not entitle them to what they sought and obtained in the courts below: the qualified immunity from suit accorded government officials under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800 (1982).
Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1832. This illustrates the discordant treatment of the common law by the Court. As was
recognized in Imbler, § 1983 recognizes no immunities. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417. The Court in Pierson first recognized a good faith defense, which later Courts transformed into an immunity. See supra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
Citing the court of appeals' opinion, the Wyatt Court rejected respondent's argument: "[A]lthough it acknowledged that a defense is not the same as an immunity, the court maintained it could 'transfor[m] a common law
defense extant at the time of§ 1983's passage into an immunity.' " Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1831 (second alteration in
original) (citing the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Wyatt, 928 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Folsom Inv. Co. v.
Moore, 681 F.2d 1032, 1038 (5th Cir. 1982))).
The Court in Watt rejected the lower court's transformation, although this is precisely what the Court did in
Pierson in extending immunity to the police officers in that case. See supra notes 80-98.
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inquiries as separate. In Wyatt, the Court ties history and policy together as if they
were but one inquiry. "[A]s our precedents make clear, the reasons for recognizing
such an immunity were based not simply on the existence of a good-faith defense
at common law, but on the special policy concerns involved in suing government
officials."296

Justice Kennedy does not rely heavily on a historical analysis in concluding that
respondents were not entitled to qualified immunity in the lower courts. Rather,
Justice Kennedy uses a policy analysis in reaching his conclusion.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion noted the Court's divergence from the
common law with respect to qualified immunity:
Our cases on the subject [of qualified immunity] diverge from the common law in
two ways. First as The Chief Justice acknowledges, modern qualified immunity
does not turn on the subjective belief of the defendant. Second, the immunity diverges from the common-law model by requiring the defendant, not the plaintiff, to
bear the burden of proof on the probable cause issue.297
These distinctions weigh heavily in Justice Kennedy's rationale. Presumably,
Justice Kennedy recognized that at common law the defenses of good faith and
probable cause-the defenses from which qualified immunity in a public official
context were derived -turned on the subjective intent of the defendant. With the
evolution of qualified immunity, the Court eliminated the subjective inquiry in favor of an objective criteria.298 Ostensibly, this evolution took qualified immunity
out of a pure common-law model and instead placed it in a contemporary context,
better suited to meet the stated aims of the doctrine . 299 Under Justice Kennedy's
reasoning, however, the subjective good-faith of the common law defenses did not
make this transformation in a private party context. "Whether or not it is correct to
diverge in these respects from the common-law model when governmental agents
are the defendants, we ought not to adopt an automatic rule that the same analysis
applies in suits against private persons.""'
Justice Kennedy concluded his concurring opinion:
[Tihere is support in the common law for the proposition that a private individual's
reliance on a statute, prior to a judicial determination of unconstitutionality, is considered reasonable as a matter of law; and therefore under the circumstances of this

296. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1832-33.
297. Id. (citations omitted).
298. See supr notes 122-47 and accompanying text.
299. In Harlow, the Court articulated the reasons for adopting an objective standard:
[Blare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or
to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery ....
. . . Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct. . . should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgement.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982).
300. W att, 112 S. Ct. at 1836 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy further stated that since immunity
from suit implies that the underlying conduct was wrong, but unredressable if the conduct meets a reasonable
person test, application of this standard is inconsistent where a private person may have subjectively and in good
faith relied on a presumptively valid statute. Id.

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGELA WREVIEW

[Vol. 14:127

case, lack of probable cause can only be shown through proof of subjective bad
faith. 30 1
Justice Kennedy noted his approval of the Chief Justice's historical overview:
"My conclusions are a mere consequence of the historical principles described in
the opinion of the Chief Justice."30 2 However, after reviewing the Chief Justice's
historical analysis of qualified immunity, Justice Kennedy stated that common law
support alone was not enough to extend qualified immunity to Cole and
Robbins. 33
The dissent relied heavily on the common law in arguing that private § 1983
defendants should be afforded qualified immunity if their conduct was objectively
reasonable. "I think it is clear that at the time § 1983 was adopted, there generally
was available to private parties a good-faith defense to the torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process."303 The Chief Justice argued that the existence of a
defense at common law to torts, analogous to the statute alleged to be constitutionally infirm and upon which § 1983 liability was predicated, justified extending
qualified immunity to the respondents . 3 ' Arguing that the common law provides
substantial support for respondents' assertion of immunity, Chief Justice
Rehnquist singled out the lack of probable cause element to the tort of malicious
prosecution which focused on the objective reasonableness of the defendant's
actions."36 "Thus, respondents can successfully defend this suit simply by establishing that their reliance on the attachment statute was307objectively reasonable for
someone with their knowledge of the circumstances.
The dissent further argued that this objectively determined "defense" should be
tested on a motion for summary judgment since at common law probable cause
was a question of law.308 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded his historical analysis
by stating that a good-faith defense placed the respondents in the same position as
30
allowing them to assert qualified immunity would have. 1

301. Id. at 1837.
302. Id. at 1835.
303. Id.
304. Id.at 1837-38 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
305. "But I think the Court errs in suggesting the availability of a good-faith common law defense at the time of
§ 1983's adoption is not sufficient to support [respondent's] claim to immunity." Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827,
1838 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 1839.
307. Id.
308. Id. (citations omitted).
309. Id.
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B. PublicPolicy Considerationsand the
Rationalefor Denying Cole and
Robbins Qualified Immunity
Wyatt was decided on policy grounds.31 The rationale for the holding is based
on a lack of common law support for qualified immunity in a private party context
as well as policy considerations. The opinion is, however, best viewed from a policy standpoint. A review of the Court's immunity jurisprudence shows that the
Court has used the common law as a vehicle for arriving at policy goals. 311 In
Wyatt, the Court held that these policy goals simply do not apply to private individuals; thus, the common law vehicle broke down.
After reviewing the Court's prior immunity decisions, Justice O'Connor stated
that "we conclude that the rationales mandating qualified immunity for public officials are not applicable to private parties."312 The opinion further stated that extending qualified immunity to private individuals "would have no bearing on
whether public officials are able to act forcefully and decisively in their jobs or
whether qualified applicants enter public service."" 3 This is inconsistent with the
Court's prior justifications for extending or denying qualified immunity.
As Justice Kennedy noted, recognition of qualified immunity in a public official context has often diverged from the common law.314 This departure from history and the common law was necessitated by the "special policy concerns arising
from public officials' exposure to repeated suits." 15
Chief Justice Rehnquist's rationale for his dissent in Wyatt is facially appealing.
The Chief Justice stated:
The normal presumption that attaches to any law is that society will be benefitted
if private parties rely on that law to provide them a remedy, rather than turning to
some form of private, perhaps lawless, relief. In denying immunity to those who reasonably rely on presumptively valid state law, and thereby discouraging such reliance, the Court expresses confidence that today's decision will not "unduly impai[r]"
the public interest. I do not share that confidence. I would have thought it beyond

310. As both Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy noted, the policy concerns which supported extending
qualified immunity to public officials simply do not support extending qualified immunity to private parties. See
Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1833 (1992) (O'Connor, J., majority); Id. at 1835 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
311. For examples of the Court's policy announcements, see Watt, 112 S. Ct. at 1833 (citing Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)) ("[W]e have recognized qualified immunity for government officials where it
was necessary to preserve their ability to serve the public good or to ensure that talented candidates were not
deterred by the threat of damage suits from entering public service."); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526
(1985) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982)) (qualified immunity intended to prevent" 'distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able
people from public service' "); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 (1982) (inquiries into the subjective
intent are disruptive to efficient operation of government); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (immunity designed to protect public officials who must exercise discretion in exercise of authority in furthering
public good); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975) (denying qualified immunity to public officials
would lead to intimidation in decision-making).
312. Wyatt, 112 S.Ct. at 1833.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 1835 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
315. Id. (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813-14).
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peradventure that there is a strong public interest in encouragingprivate citizens to
rely on valid state laws of which they have no reason to doubt the validity.316
Justice O'Connor dismissed this rationale as not having sufficient similarity to
the "traditional purpose of qualified immunity to justify such an expansion.' 317 As
Justice O'Connor correctly points out, the Chief Justice's rationale for extending
qualified immunity to private parties would be persuasive but for one significant
factor: history and precedent do not support such an extension. The Court's immunity jurisprudence is replete with both policy and historical reasons for extending
qualified immunity to public officials. This same body of precedent is devoid of
any sound policy or historical reasons for making qualified immunity available to
private parties. As Justice O'Connor notes, private parties simply do not face the
exigencies of public office,318 most notably, the threat of being bogged down in
constitutional tort litigation for simply performing their job.
C. The Significance of Wyatt v. Cole
Facially, the holding in ff att might appear to be insignificant, given that the
Court's holding is expressly limited to "whether private persons, who conspire
with state officials to violate constitutional rights, have available the good faith immunity applicable to public officials."3 9 The Court further narrowed the issue:
"The precise issue encompassed in this question, and the only issue decided by the
lower courts, is whether qualified immunity, as enunciated in Harlow, is available
for private defendants faced with § 1983 liability for invoking a state replevin,
garnishment, or attachment statute." 321 Over the last thirty years, a majority of
states have had an attachment, garnishment, or replevin statute declared

316. Id. at 1840-41 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion at 1833) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added) (alteration in original).
317. Id. at 1833.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1834.
320. Id.
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unconstitutional. 21 There is every reason to believe that such statutes will continue to be declared unconstitutional and that persons relying on these statutes will
face constitutional litigation under the Court's holding in Lugar. As a result, the
holding in J4 att has broader implications than the narrow issue within which it is
framed. Section 1983 litigation has grown increasingly common since the enactment of The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, an amendment to
42 U.S.C § 1988.322 With this growth, more private persons will undoubtedly
find themselves styled as defendants in § 1983 claims. With the abrogation of qualified immunity in a private defendant context, these private defendants must now
look for another way to defend these suits. The Court's opinion in Wyatt suggests a
solution.
D. A SuggestedApproachfor Private

PartiesDefending a § 1983 Claim
The Court's holding in Wyatt, while foreclosing private defendants from asserting qualified immunity in § 1983 actions, leaves the door open for a good-faith
defense, reviewable on a motion for summary judgement. After announcing the
Court's holding, Justice O'Connor stated:
In so holding, however, we do not foreclose the possibility that private defendants
faced with § 1983 liability under Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., could be entitled to an
affirmative defense based on goodfaith and/or probable cause or that § 1983 suits

321. Ajudicial determination of unconstitutionality (of state replevin, garnishment, or attachment statute) has
been held to be a requirement to bringing a § 1983 action against a private person's invocation of such statutes.
See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982) ("While private misuse of a state statute does not
describe conduct that can be attributed to the State, the procedural scheme created by the statute is obviously the
product of state action. This is subject to constitutional restraints and properly may be addressed in a § 1983
action. . . ").
What follows is a collection of some, but not all, of the state replevin, garnishment, and attachment statutes that
have been declared unconstitutional as violative of due process. See also supra note 19.
Attachment statutes: Briere v. Agway Inc., 425 F. Supp. 654 (D. Vt. 1977); McClellan v. Commercial Credit
Corp., 350 F Supp. 1013 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1120 (1972); Perkins v. McGonagle, 342 A.2d 287 (Me.
1975); Etheredge v. Bradley, 502 P.2d 146 (Alaska 1972); Randone v. Appellate Dept., 488 P.2d 13 (Cal.), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1971).
Garnishmentstatutes: Western Coach Corp. v. Shreve, 475 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1973) (Arizona); Cristiano v.
Courts of Justices of Peace, 669 F. Supp. 662 (D. Del. 1987); Jackson v. Galan, 631 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. La.
1986); Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 E Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); McCallop v. Carberry, 464 P.2d 122
(Cal. 1970); Jones Press Inc. v. Motor Travel Servs., Inc., 176 N.W.2d 87 (Minn. 1970).
Replevin statutes: Turner v. Colonial Fin. Corp., 467 F2d 202 (5th Cir. 1972). Turner represents the first of
two judicial determinations that Mississippi's replevin statute violated due process. In Wyatt, the district court
held an amended version to be violative of due process. Wyatt v. Cole, 710 F. Supp. 180, 183 (S.D. Miss. 1989);
Williams v. Berry, 492 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. 1973); Sena v. Montoya, 346 F. Supp. 5 (D. N.M. 1972); Mitchell v.
Tennessee, 351 F Supp. 846 (W.D. Tenn. 1972); Dorsey v. Community Stores, 346 F Supp. 103 (E.D. Wis.
1972); Blair v. Pitchess, 486 P.2d 1242 (Cal. 1971); Massey Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Peterson, 524 P.2d 1066
(Idaho 1974); Throp Credit, Inc. v. Barr, 200 N.W.2d 535 (Iowa), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 919 (1972);
General Elec. Corp. v. Hatch, 443 N.E.2d 1054 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
322. The Act provides that "[I]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [42 U.S.C. § 1983]... the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
According to one commentator, allowance of attorneys fees in § 1983 actions has resulted in "an explosion of
litigation in the Supreme Court and the courts of appeal under this Act." NAIiMOD, supra note 74, at § 1.02.
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against private, rather than governmental parties could require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens.323

Ostensibly, this good faith/probable cause defense would involve an inquiry into
the defendant's subjective intent in invoking the statute in question.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence intimates that such a defense, while turning on
the defendant's subjective intent and knowledge, should nonetheless be an appropriate inquiry at the summary judgement stage of litigation. "Under the principles
set forth in Celotex and related cases, the strength of factual allegations such as
subjective bad faith can be tested at the summary-judgement stage."324 Thus, a private defendant facing a § 1983 claim should be able to assert an affirmative goodfaith defense. Further, this affirmative defense should be testable on a motion for
summary judgement.
For some indication of what course a private § 1983 defendant might follow, the
Sixth Circuit's opinion in Duncan v. Peck321 offers some insight on just what is a
subjective good faith affirmative defense. The Duncan court's approach to what is
an appropriate defense to § 1983 suits for private parties is analogous to the defense
that the Wyatt Court suggested in dicta. 326 The court in Duncan held that a private
party should be able to assert that they, in good faith, relied on the advice of counsel in invoking a presumptively valid statute.127 An affirmative good faith defense
such as the one in Duncan inquires into the subjective intent of the defendant in
invoking the statue. 328 Therefore, a private § 1983 defendant should try to establish
that he or she subjectively in good faith relied on the statute in question.
V. CONCLUSION

The Court's immunity jurisprudence has often taken inferential leaps. In Wyatt,
the Court refused to make such a leap. The case, while correctly decided based on
the Court's prior policy pronouncements regarding qualified immunity, may indicate the current Court's unwillingness to expand the immunity doctrine beyond
current applications. The disparate treatment of qualified immunity in past
Supreme Court cases gives no insight into how the Court might decide future
cases, including those in which public officials are involved.

323. Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1834 (1992) (emphasis added).
324. Id. at 1835 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
325. 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 228-40 and accompanying text.
326. Wyatt, 112 S. Ct. at 1834. "In so holding, however, we do not foreclose the possibility that private defendants faced with § 1983 liability under Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. could be entitled to an affirmative defense
based on good faith and/or probable cause. . . ." Id. "[lit ought to be open to the defendant to show good
faith. . . ." Id. at 1837 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
327. Duncan, 844 F.2d at 1267.
328. Id.
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VI. POSTSCRIPT

Upon remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district
court once again, but on different grounds.3 29 The court found both Cole and
Robbins to be entitled to a good faith, probable cause-type defense.3 3 0 The court
pieced this conclusion together from the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy33 '
and the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist.a3 2 In this respect, the court
stated:
The five Justices who either concurred or dissented were more forthright in their
support of a standard that would relieve private parties who reasonably relied on a
state statue of liability .... When read together, we believe that the question left
open by the majority was largely answered by these separate opinions. We accordingly hold that private defendants sued on the basis of Lugar may be held liable for
damages under § 1983 only if they failed to act in good faith in invoking the unconstitutional state procedures, that is, if they either knew or should have known that the
33
statute upon which they relied was unconstitutional.

This "knew or should have known" language indicates both subjective and objective inquiries and harkens back to the pre-Harlow v. Fitzgerald standard for
qualified immunity set out in Scheuer v. Rhodes .33 The Scheuer Court held that
qualified immunity must be based on a finding of "reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances [an objective inquiry],
coupled with good faith belief [a subjective inquiry] . .

. .

The court reviewed the Supreme Court's historical and policy analysis and concluded that both Cole and Robbins had acted in subjective good faith based on a
lack of any indication of bad faith.3 35 Wyatt alleged that Cole acted with malice and
had abused the state replevin statute. 33 7 A finding of malice, however, is only half
of the court's analysis. The court held that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must not
only show that the defendant acted with malice under an unconstitutional state

329. Wyatt v. Cole, 994 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, No. 93-481, 1993 WL 384202 (Nov. 15,
1993).
330. Id. at 1120-21.
331. Wyattv. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1835-37 (1992) (Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia, J.,concurring).
332. Id. at 1838-39 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Souter, J., & Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
333. Wyatt, 994 F.2d at 1118 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
334. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
335. Id. at 247-48.
336. yatt,
994 F.2d at 1121.
337. Id. Wyatt alleged that Cole threatened to use "political influence" to secure the return of the cattle which
were at the center of the dispute, "had no grounds under state law for bringing the action in replevin," and refused
to return the cattle after being ordered to by a state court. Id. According to Wyatt, these actions by Cole defeated
any good faith claim by Cole. The court answered this by noting that "[wie do not see, however, how these allegations detailing Cole's misuse and abuse of state procedures bear on whether he in fact believed the Mississippi
[replevin] statute to be constitutionally infirm." Id. In this respect, the court's analysis seems ironic. On the one
hand the court seems to acknowledge Cole's malice in invoking the replevin statute, but on the other hand, denies
that this malice has anything to do with good faith reliance on a statute.
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statute, but also that the defendant "either knew or should have known of the statute's constitutional infirmity."338
As a result of the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Wyatt on remand, a plaintiff in a
§ 1983 action against a private defendant must plead and prove that: (1) the defendant acted with malice; and (2) that the defendant knew or should have known
that the statute they invoked was unconstitutional. Because the court again affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, it is implicit in the court's
holding that these two issues may be addressed on motion for summary judgment.

3 39

338. Id. at 1120.
339. Justice Kennedy suggested this in his concurring opinion. See Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1834-37
(1992).

